Making History • HIST 1105 • Week 13.1
Kuhn is cited by the pages of the second edition (1970). Rosenberg’s introduction is numbered in roman numerals. Johns is quoted from The Nature of the Book (1998), ch. 1.
Section one · science
1913–36 · the old story
“It is no exaggeration to say that science owes most to the shining individualism of a few chosen spirits.” (p. 36)
“Ideas, in this sort of approach, are like a set of building blocks with which thinkers play and from which the occasional genius constructs something dazzling” (Maza, pp. 86–87)
Who disappears from a history that credits “a few chosen spirits”?
1931–49 · the old story
The Scientific Revolution “outshines everything since the rise of Christianity and reduces the Renaissance and Reformation to the rank of mere episodes” Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science (1949), quoted in Shapin, p. 1
The “Whig interpretation of history,” named in 1931, judges the past as the road to the present.
Historians told science that way “through the Cold War” (Maza, p. 92).
Internal and external · 1930s
One school read Galileo’s science as a change in thought: mathematics, more than experiment, remade physics.
Another tied Newton’s Principia to the needs of shipping, mining and war, and English science to Puritan values.
Later historians named the sides. Internalists explain scientific change from inside science, by ideas, methods and evidence; externalists by the economics, religion and politics outside it. The old story of great geniuses was largely internalist.
Kuhn · 1962 · the turn
“Rather than seeking the permanent contributions of an older science to our present vantage, they attempt to display the historical integrity of that science in its own time.”
Kuhn called a shared model of “problems and solutions” a paradigm. When misfit results pile up, a crisis brings a new paradigm, “incommensurable” with the old: the two can’t be judged by the same standards (Maza, p. 93, on Copernicus).
If paradigms can’t be judged by the same standards, in what sense is later science better science?
1970s · science and the occult
His work toward gravitation was “rooted in the great scientist’s avid and extensive research into the ‘dark arts’ of alchemy.” Maza, Thinking About History, p. 99
The line between science and “occult” pursuits hardened only in the eighteenth century (p. 99).
1979 · the laboratory
“There is as much society inside the scientist’s laboratory, and internal to the development of scientific knowledge, as there is outside.” Shapin, The Scientific Revolution, p. 10
Laboratory Life (1979) followed scientists at a Salk Institute laboratory in California, as an anthropologist would follow a village.
They saw facts take shape through arguing, writing and persuading. The first subtitle was The Social Construction of Scientific Facts.
1979 · print
“The ‘Scientific Revolution’ was thus inconceivable without a preceding printing revolution.” Adrian Johns, The Nature of the Book (1998), p. 11, summarizing the argument
Print gave texts “fixity”: the same words, repeatable anywhere (Johns, p. 10).
Its hero was Tycho Brahe, who set printed rival models of the universe side by side and saw where they disagreed (pp. 10–11).
After Kuhn · 1970s–80s · constructivism
“the belief that scientific knowledge is a human creation, made with available material and cultural resources, rather than simply the revelation of a natural order that is pre-given and independent of human action.”
The linguistic turn read sources as “texts,” not transparent windows onto the past. Constructivists treated scientific knowledge the same way: as made, not simply found.
If a belief has a social cause, has anyone yet said whether it is true?
1985 · politics
“solutions to the problem of knowledge are solutions to the problem of social order.”
After two decades of civil war, Boyle’s experimenters stood for freedom used responsibly. Hobbes, author of Leviathan, a defense of absolute rule, trusted only mathematical proof in science and a single authority in the state (pp. 96–97).
Shapin · 1994 · trust
“Experimental science flourished in seventeenth-century England, Shapin argues, because it was conducted by a group of elite practitioners—’gentlemen,’ members of the landed upper class—who both trusted one another and had moral authority in the society at large.”
Whom do you trust on science today, and what makes them trustworthy: credentials, numbers or someone like you?
Shapin · 1996
“There was no such thing as the Scientific Revolution, and this is a book about it. Some time ago, when the academic world offered more certainty and more comforts, historians announced the real existence of a coherent, cataclysmic, and climactic event that fundamentally and irrevocably changed what people knew about the natural world … It was the moment at which the world was made modern, it was a Good Thing”
Shapin · 1996 · what is argued
Many historians doubt any “singular and discrete event,” and any single “science” or “scientific method” to revolutionize (pp. 3–4).
The continuity of seventeenth-century natural philosophy with its medieval past “is now routinely asserted” (p. 4).
Older accounts treated ideas as if they “floated freely in conceptual space.” Newer ones ask what people did to make an observation or run an experiment (p. 4).
Whether science’s causes were intellectual or social was long argued. Shapin calls the split “a rather silly demarcation” (p. 9).
Shapin, The Scientific Revolution, pp. 3–4, 9
Shapin · 1996 · who took part
“The half of the European population that was female was in a position to participate in scientific culture scarcely at all, as was that overwhelming majority—of men and women—who were illiterate or otherwise disqualified from entering the venues of formal learning.”
If only a few took part, “in what sense, if at all,” was it the moment “modernity was made, for ‘us’”? (pp. 4–5).
Shapin · 1996 · ancestors
“Yet there is absolutely no reason we should not want to know how we got from there to here, who the ancestors were, and what the lineage is that connects us to the past.”
Such stories, he warns, are “not likely to be sensitive accounts of how it was in the past”: Galileo, Descartes and Boyle were hardly typical of their countrymen (p. 7).
Is it wrong to judge the past as the road to the present if the road really did lead here?
1998 · print and trust
“In such a world, questions of credit took the place of assumptions of fixity.” Adrian Johns, The Nature of the Book (1998), p. 31
Early print was full of piracy and error, so readers had to decide which books to believe (p. 31). Even Tycho could not get his star catalogue printed (p. 18).
In 1712 Newton and Halley printed an astronomer’s star catalogue against his “vehement opposition” (p. 55).
Print and trust
Print fixed texts, so scholars could compare, correct and build on them. The Renaissance and Reformation were “rendered permanent” by permanent texts (as Johns summarizes it, p. 11).
Fixity “exists only inasmuch as it is recognized and acted upon by people” (p. 19). Printed texts were trusted “only as a result of hard work” (p. 36).
The later view builds on Shapin’s trust: not only whom to believe, but which printed books (p. 31). The two authors argued it out in the American Historical Review in 2002.
2007 · objectivity
“The objectivity of the experimental matter of fact … was an artifact of certain forms of discourse and certain modes of social solidarity.” Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), quoted in Maza, p. 97
Objectivity (2007) traced scientific atlases and found self-restraint as an ideal of science taking shape only in the nineteenth century.
Earlier atlases trusted the expert’s eye to show the typical body.
2007 · circulation
“the reframing of historians’ ‘where’ … from the single location to transnational and global expanses, all of which have entailed challenges to Eurocentrism.” Maza, Thinking About History, p. 116
Older accounts had Western science radiating from Europe. Relocating Modern Science (2007) argued that South Asia and Europe made it together.
Maza · 2017 · who did science
“Science, in short, was not just produced by savants in learned societies but practiced by all sorts of people with very concrete needs and agendas—performing at court, impressing wealthy friends, firing an intricate piece of pottery, or, in the case of wives and family members, providing unacknowledged assistance of every sort.”
Shapin says women and the illiterate took part in scientific culture “scarcely at all”; Maza says “all sorts of people” practiced science. Who is right, and what is each counting as science?
Section two · medicine
Doctors’ histories · to 1930
“Although it has been a traditional concern of physicians, antiquarians, and moralists, the study of disease is still comparatively novel for social scientists.”
Antiquarians were collectors of old things and texts. Doctors wrote most early histories of medicine: great men from Hippocrates to Pasteur beating back ignorance.
1930s–40s · society
“Every aspect of medicine’s history is necessarily ‘social,’ whether acted out in laboratory, library, or at the bedside.”
One doctor-historian wrote about disease, health insurance and workers’ illness, not only doctors.
1961 · madness
Critics came to see diagnoses “as tools of social control, as labels for deviance” Rosenberg, “Framing Disease,” p. xvi
Madness and Civilization (1961) argued that the asylum replaced chains with constant watching.
Deviance: behavior a society treats as abnormal.
Was unchaining the mad an act of kindness or a quieter kind of control?
Rosenberg · 1962 · cholera
Once cholera was known to spread “through the water supply, policy choices were reframed not only in practical engineering terms but in political and moral ones.” Rosenberg, “Framing Disease,” p. xx
The Cholera Years (1962) followed the epidemics of 1832, 1849 and 1866. Americans first read cholera as punishment for sin, later as a problem of filth and water.
A disease showed what a society believed.
1970s · ecology
Historians took up “an ecological vision of history in which disease plays a key role, for example, in the Spanish conquest of Central and South America.” Rosenberg, “Framing Disease,” p. xv
The Columbian Exchange (1972) traced the plants, animals and germs that crossed the Atlantic after 1492. Plagues and Peoples (1976) went worldwide.
1976 · did medicine work?
“How much credit should go to specific medical interventions … and how much to changed economic and social circumstances?” Rosenberg, “Framing Disease,” p. xv
The Modern Rise of Population (1976) argued that better food, more than medicine, cut tuberculosis deaths. The claim drew controversy (n. 7).
The policy question follows: spend on cures, or on prevention (p. xv)?
1970s–80s · construction
Social construction “has forcefully reminded us that medical thought and practice are rarely free of cultural constraint, even in matters seemingly technical.”
Does saying a disease is framed by society make it any less real to the person who has it?
1970s–80s · blame
“It is difficult indeed to think of any significant area of social debate and tension—ideas of race, gender, class, and industrialization—in which hypothetical disease etiologies have not served to project and rationalize widely held values and attitudes.”
An etiology is a theory of what causes a disease. Such theories often carried, and justified, blame. The debate “has hardly ceased,” he wrote, citing AIDS (p. xxii).
1985 · patients
Rosenberg names, as one trend, “the emphasis among professional historians on social history and the experience of ordinary men and women.” Rosenberg, “Framing Disease,” p. xv
A 1985 essay asked for medical history from below, from the patient’s view, as workers’ history had been written from below.
1990 · childbirth
“Pregnancy and childbirth, for example, like epidemic disease have in recent years become an accepted part of the standard historical canon.” Rosenberg, “Framing Disease,” p. xv
A Midwife’s Tale (1990) used a Maine midwife’s diary of more than eight hundred births, 1785–1812.
Women’s healing, missing from doctors’ histories, became evidence.
Rosenberg · 1992 · the field
Social history: patients, childbirth, epidemics.
Did medicine or living conditions lengthen lives? Demographers counted.
Disease in the conquest of the Americas.
Diagnoses as labels for deviance; the most influential.
How a disease gets defined, and what the definition does to lives, policy and care (Rosenberg, pp. xv–xvi).
Rosenberg · 1992 · reframing disease
It happens in bodies, and in animals, whatever anyone calls it.
A generation’s “verbal constructs,” shaped by medicine’s ideas and institutions.
An occasion for public policy, and a potential justification of it.
An aspect of a person’s social role and identity.
A way a culture backs up what it values.
A structuring element in how doctors and patients deal with each other.
Rosenberg, “Framing Disease,” p. xiii
Rosenberg · 1992 · frame
“In some ways disease does not exist until we have agreed that it does, by perceiving, naming, and responding to it.”
Cholera killed before anyone agreed what it was. In what sense did the disease “not exist”?
1993 · empire
Rosenberg noted “a recent growth of interest in ‘imperial’ medicine” Rosenberg, “Framing Disease,” p. xxv n. 9
Colonizing the Body (1993) showed that against plague in 1896–97, officials searched homes and moved families into camps.
It argues that Indian resistance made officials back down.
Two fields · one course
Great men and the birth of the modern world. Then inside and outside causes and Kuhn’s paradigms; then laboratory facts, political order and trust; then women, print that earned credit, objectivity’s history and circulation.
Doctors’ histories of great men and germ hunters. Then society, the asylum and cholera; then disease in conquest, doubts about medicine’s credit, patients, race, gender and empire, and disease as a frame.
The path of history itself: Ranke’s nations, then history from below, gender and the linguistic turn.
The take home
“What we select inevitably represents our interests, even if we aim all the while to ‘tell it like it really was.’ That is to say, there is inevitably something of ‘us’ in the stories we tell about the past.”
Science and medicine have histories because people made them, trusted them and named things with them. What we take as settled now will have a history too.
Next · 13.2 · environmental history
A century from now, what will historians say we got wrong about science or medicine, and how will they know?