Making History • HIST 1105 • Week 13.1
Kuhn is cited by the pages of the second edition (1970). Johns is quoted from The Nature of the Book (1998), ch. 1.
1913–36 · the old story
“It is no exaggeration to say that science owes most to the shining individualism of a few chosen spirits.” (p. 36)
“Ideas, in this sort of approach, are like a set of building blocks with which thinkers play and from which the occasional genius constructs something dazzling” (Maza, pp. 86–87)
Who disappears from a history that credits “a few chosen spirits”?
1931–49 · the old story
The Scientific Revolution “outshines everything since the rise of Christianity and reduces the Renaissance and Reformation to the rank of mere episodes” Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science (1949), quoted in Shapin, p. 1
Herbert Butterfield named the “Whig interpretation of history” in a 1931 book of that title: judging the past as the road to the present. Historians told science that way “through the Cold War” (Maza, p. 92).
Internal and external · 1930s
Alexandre Koyré, Galilean Studies (1939), read Galileo’s science as a change in thought: mathematics, more than experiment, remade physics.
Boris Hessen (1931) tied Newton’s Principia to the needs of shipping, mining and war; Robert Merton (1938) tied English science to Puritan values.
Later historians named the sides. Internalists explain scientific change from inside science, by ideas, methods and evidence; externalists by the economics, religion and politics outside it. The old story of great geniuses was largely internalist.
Kuhn · 1962 · the turn
“Rather than seeking the permanent contributions of an older science to our present vantage, they attempt to display the historical integrity of that science in its own time.”
Kuhn called a shared model of “problems and solutions” a paradigm. When misfit results pile up, a crisis brings a new paradigm, “incommensurable” with the old: the two can’t be judged by the same standards (Maza, p. 93, on Copernicus).
If paradigms can’t be judged by the same standards, in what sense is later science better science?
1970s · science and the occult
His work toward gravitation was “rooted in the great scientist’s avid and extensive research into the ‘dark arts’ of alchemy.” Maza, Thinking About History, p. 99
Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs, The Foundations of Newton’s Alchemy (1975), made the case. The line between science and “occult” pursuits hardened only in the eighteenth century (p. 99).
1979 · the laboratory
“There is as much society inside the scientist’s laboratory, and internal to the development of scientific knowledge, as there is outside.” Shapin, The Scientific Revolution, p. 10
Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar’s Laboratory Life (1979) studied a Salk Institute laboratory as an anthropologist would a village, and saw facts made by arguing and writing.
1979 · print
“The ‘Scientific Revolution’ was thus inconceivable without a preceding printing revolution.” Adrian Johns, The Nature of the Book (1998), p. 11, summarizing the argument
Elizabeth Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change (1979): print gave texts “fixity,” the same words, repeatable anywhere (Johns, p. 10). Its hero was Tycho Brahe, comparing printed rival models of the universe (pp. 10–11).
After Kuhn · 1970s–80s · constructivism
“the belief that scientific knowledge is a human creation, made with available material and cultural resources, rather than simply the revelation of a natural order that is pre-given and independent of human action.”
The linguistic turn read sources as “texts,” not transparent windows onto the past. Constructivists treated scientific knowledge the same way: as made, not simply found.
If a belief has a social cause, has anyone yet said whether it is true?
1985 · politics
“solutions to the problem of knowledge are solutions to the problem of social order.”
After two decades of civil war, Boyle’s experimenters stood for freedom used responsibly. Hobbes, author of Leviathan, a defense of absolute rule, trusted only mathematical proof in science and a single authority in the state (pp. 96–97).
Shapin · 1994 · trust
“Experimental science flourished in seventeenth-century England, Shapin argues, because it was conducted by a group of elite practitioners—’gentlemen,’ members of the landed upper class—who both trusted one another and had moral authority in the society at large.”
Whom do you trust on science today, and what makes them trustworthy: credentials, numbers or someone like you?
Shapin · 1996
“There was no such thing as the Scientific Revolution, and this is a book about it. Some time ago, when the academic world offered more certainty and more comforts, historians announced the real existence of a coherent, cataclysmic, and climactic event that fundamentally and irrevocably changed what people knew about the natural world … It was the moment at which the world was made modern, it was a Good Thing”
Shapin · 1996 · what is argued
Many historians doubt any “singular and discrete event,” and any single “science” or “scientific method” to revolutionize (pp. 3–4).
The continuity of seventeenth-century natural philosophy with its medieval past “is now routinely asserted” (p. 4).
Older accounts treated ideas as if they “floated freely in conceptual space.” Newer ones ask what people did to make an observation or run an experiment (p. 4).
Whether science’s causes were intellectual or social was long argued. Shapin calls the split “a rather silly demarcation” (p. 9).
Shapin, The Scientific Revolution, pp. 3–4, 9
Shapin · 1996 · who took part
“The half of the European population that was female was in a position to participate in scientific culture scarcely at all, as was that overwhelming majority—of men and women—who were illiterate or otherwise disqualified from entering the venues of formal learning.”
If only a few took part, “in what sense, if at all,” was it the moment “modernity was made, for ‘us’”? (pp. 4–5).
Shapin · 1996 · ancestors
“Yet there is absolutely no reason we should not want to know how we got from there to here, who the ancestors were, and what the lineage is that connects us to the past.”
Such stories, he warns, are “not likely to be sensitive accounts of how it was in the past”: Galileo, Descartes and Boyle were hardly typical of their countrymen (p. 7).
Is it wrong to judge the past as the road to the present if the road really did lead here?
1998 · print and trust
“In such a world, questions of credit took the place of assumptions of fixity.” Adrian Johns, The Nature of the Book (1998), p. 31
Early print was full of piracy and error, so readers had to decide which books to believe (p. 31). In 1712 Newton and Halley printed an astronomer’s star catalogue against his “vehement opposition” (p. 55).
Print and trust
Print fixed texts, so scholars could compare, correct and build on them. The Renaissance and Reformation were “rendered permanent” by permanent texts (as Johns summarizes it, p. 11).
Fixity “exists only inasmuch as it is recognized and acted upon by people” (p. 19). Printed texts were trusted “only as a result of hard work” (p. 36).
The later view builds on Shapin’s trust: not only whom to believe, but which printed books (p. 31). The two authors argued it out in the American Historical Review in 2002.
2007 · objectivity
“The objectivity of the experimental matter of fact … was an artifact of certain forms of discourse and certain modes of social solidarity.” Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), quoted in Maza, p. 97
Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison’s Objectivity (2007) traced scientific atlases and found self-restraint as an ideal of science taking shape only in the nineteenth century. Earlier atlases trusted the expert’s eye to show the typical body.
2007 · circulation
“the reframing of historians’ ‘where’ … from the single location to transnational and global expanses, all of which have entailed challenges to Eurocentrism.” Maza, Thinking About History, p. 116
Older accounts had Western science radiating from Europe. Kapil Raj’s Relocating Modern Science (2007) argued that South Asia and Europe made it together.
Maza · 2017 · who did science
“Science, in short, was not just produced by savants in learned societies but practiced by all sorts of people with very concrete needs and agendas—performing at court, impressing wealthy friends, firing an intricate piece of pottery, or, in the case of wives and family members, providing unacknowledged assistance of every sort.”
Shapin says women and the illiterate took part in scientific culture “scarcely at all”; Maza says “all sorts of people” practiced science. Who is right, and what is each counting as science?
Next · 14.1 · the history of medicine